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In our country, the special corporate ownership in listed companies has created 
agency conflicts between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. Because 
the market mechanisms to protect minority investors are not perfect and mechanisms 
to hold in controlling shareholder haven’t been constructed fully, controlling 
shareholder often tunnel listed companies and minority shareholders through many 
kinds of ways. Among them, embezzling funds of listed companies is an outright 
mean which has impeded our country’s securities market’s development and becomes 
the main risk of listed companies. 
In essence, expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling sharehoder is 
relevant to the institutional environment of our economy besides the special splitting 
ownership structure in our country’s listed companies. Since the evolvement of 
marketization in our country is through empowerment by central government to local 
government, our different local economic development appears non-equilibrium and 
differences are also significant including evolvement of marketization, government 
disturbance on enterprises and legal protection of minority shareholders, which will 
influence agency conflicts between controlling sharedholder and minority 
shareholders, and the quality of listed companies in different aspects. 
Agency conflicts between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders and 
potential expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholder not only 
will influence listed company’s quality, but also will affect the transparency of capital 
market including truth of information disclosure, which is the foundation of the 
development of securities market.  
As a media, the main role of external auditors is to transmit and safeguard of 
accounting information by assuring it, employed as monitors and bonding 
mechanisms to mitigate agency conflicts and limit controlling shareholder’s abilities 
to hold up minority shareholders. But effective governing of external auditors depends 
on competitive environment of audit markets and valid monitoring by government. 
Using embezzling funds of listed companies by controlling shareholder as proxy 
for expropriation of minority shareholders from controlling shareholder, this 
dissertation first investigates the relationship between institutional environment and 
expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholder. Institutional 
environment consists of evolvement marketization, government disturbance on firms 
and legal protection of minority investors. Then, we test the influence entrenchment 
of the controlling shareholder on the capital market’s transparency through proxy the 














governance role of external auditors in holding in the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by controlling shareholder and alleviating the agency conflicts between 
controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. 
We find that listed companies are more subject to the agency problem embedded 
in their embezzlement of listed company’s funds, the lower of value relevance of 
accounting earnings and the more severely of listed company’s earnings management. 
Our results also suggest significant improvement of institutional environment can 
mitigate controlling shareholder’s embezzlement of funds. As to the governance role 
of external auditors, our results show that firms are less to employ high quality 
auditors when they are subject to the agency problem embedded in their 
embezzlement of listed company’s funds. In addition, auditor will more likely set a 
‘not clean’ audit opinion. 
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